New Zealand has seen a change in policy direction from the provision of taxation incentives for Government demonstrated that they are no longer opposed to providing 'incentives' to encourage retirement income savings, with the implementation of schemes targeted at the individual level and the workbased level. The indication is that taxation incentives to encourage retirement savings are more likely to be witnessed in a welfarist political environment. Conversely if the political environment has a stronger neoliberal focus, the support for taxation incentives is likely to reduce.
Introduction
The New Zealand government has provided some form of statefunded retirement income for its elderly population since the Old Age Pensions Act (OAPA) in 1898. Over the next 100 or so years (18982000) there were three main periods of differing approaches to retirement income provision that can be delineated by pivotal legislation. In addition, during this 100plus year period there have been a variety of viewpoints expressed on the advantages and disadvantages of providing taxation incentives to encourage private retirement income savings by individuals. Today no deliberate taxation incentives associated with retirement income savings are provided in New Zealand. 1 Nonetheless, the debate continues as to whether the nonprovision of retirement income taxation incentives is the appropriate path, particularly as the New Zealand population ages. 2 The objective of this paper is to investigate the historical debates and policy arguments for, and against, the provision of taxation incentives for retirement income savings. The paper considers the debates (or lack of) that occurred during each of the three periods (18981938, 19381984, 19842000) to explain the nature and role of taxation incentives on retirement income savings. It then considers the approach taken in the current period (20002005) . Parker (1997) writes that history helps us put our present into context and better informs the accounting and management decisions we must make tomorrow. This is based on a utilitarianism view of history whereby historical research provides insights into the origins of current concepts and practices and can provide explanations and solutions to contemporary issues as well as informing future directions (Napier, 1989) . This research considers previous policy decisions in order to build a view of how well history assists in explaining the present situation, which may, in turn, help to inform future policy decisions.
Research on taxation in New Zealand is limited. Hooper (1998) provides an overview of the origins of New Zealand customs, excise, income, land, estate and other taxes and duties, while Holmes (2001) examines the origins of income. More recently, Kearins (2003 and 2004) consider the historical aspects of nineteenth century New Zealand taxation, using a genealogical methodology based on the work of Foucault. Their first paper examines the implementation of capital taxation and public finance and the impact on Māori. It concludes that taxation by preemption (the monopoly purchase of Māori land by the New Zealand Government for resale at inflated prices between 1840 and 1859) is in substance a capital gains tax on Māori landowners. The second paper considers the wealth tax affect caused by Māori land confiscation, which provided the Government with a major revenue source in the 18601880 period. This study, on taxation incentives for retirement income savings, covers a later period of New Zealand history than the above, and investigates an area not covered by previous New Zealand taxation histories. This paper commences with an overview of superannuation and related taxation incentives during which the research method is presented. Following this, the theoretical background used for analysis is detailed, outlining some of the fundamental justifications used for the provision of taxation incentives. The following three sections analyse the policy changes for each period together with any discussions that occurred around the proposed policies. The paper concludes with a discussion on the extent to which history can explain the present day situation.
Background and method
One of the key analytical tools used in historical research is that of periodisation. This allows us to make sense of historical events over an extended time frame by separating the chronology into specified time divisions. The classification of the periods requires the identification of significant events, dates or turning points that determine change and allow the researcher to divide the chronological timeline. Researchers need to identify "an event of such significance that it would mark the beginning of a new period" (Phillips, 2002 , p.371; Lieberman, 2001 ). This paper analyses the debates around taxation incentives and retirement incomes savings during four periods in New Zealand history, including the current approach. These periods are based on a Weberian interpretation of the development of New Zealand that focuses on the contingent and contextual nature of the State; that is, State formation and the development of State institutions based on the nature of the social forces that intrude on the State and the social policies originating from the State (Wilkes, 1993; Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997) .
In each of these periods the role played by the state differs. The Liberal State resulted from the election of a Liberal Government (a coalition of small farmers, workers and manufacturers) and was a result of firstly, the 1880s long depression, where the number of settlers who were unable to avoid poverty grew, and secondly, a change to a oneperson onevote system (McClure, 1998) . This Liberal Government laid the foundation for the welfare state via state intervention and regulation. It reformed land ownership by imposing a steep graduated land tax that broke up the land monopolies, and introduced labour regulations and legislation. New social polices gave targeted support for old age.
The OAPA 1898 provided a modest pension of ₤18 a year (or around onethird of a workingman's wage (Preston, 1999) ) to people aged 65 years and over who met certain criteria such as residency requirements, being of good character, and an income and asset test (Ministry of Social Development, 2003) . Only around onethird of the population aged over 65 qualified for the pension, and targeting measures meant that most Māori received less than the full rate. Furthermore, until 1936 individuals of Asian nationality were excluded. The OAPA 1898 was amended several times in subsequent years.
After the implementation of the targeted old age pension, successive governments looked for ways to encourage people to provide for their own retirement rather than relying on state funded pensions.
The incentives introduced included the establishment of the National Provident Fund in 1910, and tax concessions for investment in private superannuation, the investment earnings of superannuation funds, and employer contributions to superannuation funds. Nonetheless increasing political agitation and changing social forces in the 19101935 period along with World War I and the depression led to the election of the 1935 Labour Government and a significant change to State policy and institutions (Wilkes, 1993; Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997; Hooper, 1998 .
After the 1935 election, welfare arrangements based on the ideals of security, citizenship, universalism and equity were introduced (MacGregor, 1999) . The result was a "…coalition formed of Labour, Capital and State," (Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997, p.176) based around full employment, economic growth and targeted and universal social welfare support. This was a response to the recent hardships and the perceived failure of neoclassical economic policies. The policies introduced were based on the nuclear family and the male breadwinner and incorporated a 'cult of domesticity' and 'ethnic paternalism' and hence ignored minorities such as women and the Māori (Wilkes, 1993; Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997; MacGregor, 1999 .
The 'watershed' Social Security Act 1938 saw the introduction of a dual publicly provided pension system. People of retirement age, who had been resident in New Zealand for twenty years, were able to choose between an age benefit, which was not taxed, but was subject to an income test, and payable from the age of 60 (Social Security Act 1938, s14 -17); and a superannuation benefit, which was not income tested, but was taxable, and payable from the age of 65 (Social Security Act 1938, s13) .
Individuals that did not qualify for the meanstested age benefit of initially £78 per year received the universal 4 superannuation benefit (of initially £10 p.a. with yearly increases of £210s, until parity was reached with the meanstested benefit) when they reached 65 years of age (Rice, 1992 (Wilkes, 1993; Thorns and Sedgwick, 1997; Hooper, 1998; MacGregor, 1999 . It also resulted in the removal of taxation incentives for retirement income savings. with the onus on the employee to advise the Inland Revenue Department if they intend to take this option. Contribution rates will be set at either four or eight per cent of salary, and will be 'locked in' until retirement, with certain exceptions. 7 As with the State Sector Retirement Savings Scheme, the accounts are not tax preferred, but 'incentives' will exist in the form of a $1,000 government contribution to each new KiwiSaver account, together with a fee subsidy. These new initiatives, that promote individual responsibility in conjunction with government assistance, suggest a change to a social policy focus that permits taxation incentives for retirement income savings.
The information in this paper is derived from both primary and secondary sources of information.
Primary sources include the parliamentary debates and newspapers of the periods under investigation.
The paper uses a narrative approach to build a view of the past, with a particular focus on the economic and social perspectives of the time. Previts, Parker and Coffman (1990) write that even pure narratives must employ explanation and seek in some manner to predict. This paper adopts an economic theory framework to provide this explanation. The analysis focuses on any debates and discussions that occurred at the time of each policy change and focuses on the key piece of legislation involved. Economic theory is used to group the various arguments of each period. Nevertheless, as it is recognised that neoclassical economics has developed significantly during the second half of the twentieth century, economic theory is predominantly used as a basis from which to consider the arguments raised during the periods discussed, rather than as a measurement of sufficiency or completeness.
The theory of taxation incentives
This section discusses the literature on taxation incentives. For the purposes of this paper, incentives are considered to be any concession, rebate, credit, subsidy or contribution the government makes, either directly or via an employer, towards an individual's retirement income saving. The economic and policy justifications commonly raised relating to taxation incentives are numerous. This paper does not attempt to cover the range of arguments and perspectives on the topic of taxation incentives, instead it will use some of the fundamental theoretical views expressed as a framework for the discussions that follow. These theoretical arguments are covered in this section. Firstly, some of the primary arguments in support of taxation incentives are outlined, followed by those against taxation incentives.
Arguments in support of taxation incentives

Increased national savings
There is mixed evidence on the likelihood of an increase in national savings occurring as a result of taxation incentives. The best available estimate is that up to 30% of balances resulting from incentives are new savings, while the remainder of savings represent funds redirected from other extant savings schemes. However, there is general agreement that income constraints prevent a large part of the population from saving for retirement at any meaningful level. 8 Saving will only be achieved to the extent that individuals fund contributions by reducing consumption or increasing labour supply; transfers from other savings mechanisms, increases in debtholdings or reductions in existing asset holdings will not increase national savings (Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1996) .
Economic growth
An argument for encouraging saving is that even in economies with imperfect capital mobility, higher levels of saving leads to more productive investment and ultimately wider economic development.
However, the effects that increased savings may have on economic growth are uncertain. The OECD (1994) concludes that if savings can increase investment in human capital or research and development, then the productivity of investments in physical capital financed out of the extra savings is increased, which would lead to a virtuous circle of growth. If, however, these virtuous circles of growth do not exist the impact of an increase in savings (and accordingly an increase in investment in physical capital) would be to increase the capital intensity of production, which would in turn lead to shortterm increases in growth. However, over the long term, growth would be determined by the increase in labour supply. Schulz (1992) Decrease dependency on state provided retirement income
The provision of a tax incentive now, to achieve a saving in the future (i.e. reduce dependency on stateprovided income) requires the value of the tax incentive to be recouped in order to be economically efficient. Rewarding saving (as with work force participation) has the potential to reduce future dependency traps. The OECD (1994) notes that some authors have found that increasing the possibility of financial independence in old age may motivate households to save more in other forms.
Change behaviour
Tax incentives may change peoples' behaviour by encouraging them to take responsibility for their own retirement income. This can include encouraging them to start saving adequately and earlier, and in the case of those who are already saving, to save more (New Zealand Government, 1992) .
Assuming a degree of rationality exists in individual behaviour, tax incentives may act to encourage taxpayers to provide for their own retirement through reduction of potential freeriding behaviour, whereby the tradeoff between the risk associated with reliance on entire government provision of retirement income is tempered by the incentive to undertake selfresponsibility in this regard.
Arguments against taxation incentives
Inefficiency
Inefficiency is created as incentives are provided on a universal basis, and accordingly they do not differentiate between individuals who would have saved without the presence of the incentive.
Accordingly, incentives are allocated both to where they are needed to encourage saving, as well as to where they are not. Furthermore, efficiency is decreased to the extent that the benefit provided by the incentives is greater than any additional saving created as a result of the policy. Incentives will only increase personal saving to the extent that individuals fund their contributions by reducing their consumption. Contributions that are funded by reducing saving through other mechanisms, while at the same time paying fewer taxes, will not raise overall savings.
Where different savings instruments are close substitutes and one receives advantageous tax treatment over another there is clear evidence of a very high degree of switching out of the more highly taxed assets into those which are tax privileged (OECD, 1994) . As departures from equivalent taxation of different savings vehicles will tend to divert savings away from assets which offer the highest rates of return beforetax, into assets that are less productive but yield greater aftertax returns because of the preferential tax treatment that they enjoy, tax relief for specific types of saving may stimulate the overall level of saving at the expense of an efficient allocation of saving (OECD, 1994) .
Expense
There is significant fiscal cost associated with the provision of a taxation incentive. The possibility that any increase in the quantity of savings might be achieved at the expense of a decrease in the quality of savings represents a major potential cost of introducing taxation incentives (Goss and Duncan, 1999) . Research undertaken by Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) finds that where savings incentives indicate increased savings, the results can be traced to various biases that overstate the effects of saving incentives. When these biases are removed the positive effect of the incentives of savings is removed. Research by Jump (1982 , cited in OECD, 1994 examined the effect of tax incentives on the rate of savings in Canada. Jump (1982 , cited in OECD, 1994 concluded that the incentive would effectively be a lumpsum transfer that would not encourage saving at the margin.
Jump (1982 ( , cited in OECD, 1994 observed that such incentives required the government to set higher tax rates, and accordingly may actually have perverse effects insofar as the incentives have been financed by increased taxes.
Equity
Distributional effects are likely to rise because tax incentives are most likely to benefit higher income earners. 10 Burman, Gale and Orszag (2004) argue that evidence suggests that highincome, high wealth households are more likely to finance contributions to taxpreferred accounts through shifting assets from other sources, whereas middleincome households are more likely to finance contributions through a reduction in consumption. Accordingly, higher income households are more likely to be accumulating adequate private wealth to maintain current living standards in retirement, regardless of the existence of tax incentives, whereas low or middle income households are more likely to face difficulty accumulating adequate amounts for retirement. The outcome is that retirement saving programs will not encourage saving where it is most needed.
Munnell (1982) writes that where tax concessions are given for private retirement plans, all taxpayers must pay higher taxes to make up foregone revenues, whereas not all taxpayers will be covered by such private plans. Munnell (1982) also notes the potential for benefits of tax concessions to accrue primarily to higher paid workers because the value of deferral increases with a worker's marginal tax bracket.
Distortion of decision making
The presence of taxation incentives may act to distort decisionmaking between different types of savings vehicles, whereby individuals will invest their funds in the vehicle that will provide the greatest returns. Where some institutional investments such as pension funds are taxadvantaged, neutrality is removed from the taxation system and may lead to lower overall rates of return to private savings as the tax benefit will shelter providers of preferred products from the pressure to perform faced by their nontaxadvantaged competitors. This then results in the tax benefit being dissipated through lower beforetax rates of return. 11 This pattern of distorted decision making may act to discourage risktaking, as these nonriskseeking institutions are generally reluctant to provide venture capital to newly established small companies which have been considered as being in the forefront of technological developments and providing large employment opportunities (OECD, 1994) .
Conflicting theories exist regarding rates of return and impact on saving. Boskin (1982 , cited in Swanstrom, 1989 has posited that savings respond to an increase in the aftertax rate of returnimplying that tax cuts raise savings. 12 The converse to this is that higher rates of return may discourage savings, as they make it easier for individuals to reach their savings goals (Bernheim, 2002; Swanstrom, 1989 . A study undertaken by Auerbach and Slemrod (cited in Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1996) finds a strong effect of taxbased saving incentives on the allocation of saving and assets, but little or no effect on the overall level of saving or wealth accumulation.
In summary, the theories discussed above are inconclusive regarding the extent of the impact that taxation incentives may have on increasing savings for retirement. Generally the theories that relate to macroeconomic benefits are the most uncertain. It is difficult to state with authority whether incentives are costly for the government as it is problematic to isolate the increased (or decreased)
savings that occur from such a policy change. Tax incentives are only expensive to the extent that taxation revenues foregone exceed increased levels of savings.
Most studies conclude that tax incentives affect the allocation of household portfolios, but the effect on the amount saved is less clear (Japelli and Pistaferri, 2002; Auerbach and Slemrod, cited in Engen, Gale and Scholz, 1996) . There is general agreement from researchers and politicians that taxation incentives favour those individuals that have the least need of them. There is also general agreement that the presence of taxation incentives may influence behaviour whereby individuals will make decisions based on the investment vehicle that will provide the greatest returns, thus removing neutrality from the taxation system.
The theories outlined are used as a framework to group the primary themes that arose from the discussions during times of policy changes. The following three sections investigate three periods of differing policy practice towards the provision of tax incentives for superannuation and the different roles of the state in each period.
-1938: The Liberal State
Towards the end of the nineteenth century events such as the 'long depression' (1878 -1895) and a growing elderly population highlighted the need for public income support for the elderly.
Consequently the highly targeted Old Age Pension Act 1898 was implemented in New Zealand. Hooper (1989) writes that the Liberal government of the 1890s did much to raise the prosperity of the country. Revenues raised through taxation produced "a social welfare system that was the envy of many countries" (Hooper, 1989, p.17) . In the early twentieth century, New Zealand governments looked for ways to encourage people to provide for their retirement privately rather than expanding the scope of the taxfunded pension (Preston, 1999) . Incentives introduced included:
· The National Provident Fund that was set up in 1910. The intent of the National Provident Fund was to provide statesubsidised pensions to lowincome earners. This provided large government subsidies for those who joined as contributors to its superannuation scheme.
· Tax concessions for private superannuation were provided for in the Finance Act 1915. This resulted in individuals that were contributing to private superannuation funds receiving deductions from their taxable income of up to £100 a year.
· In 1916 concessions were extended to the investment earnings of superannuation funds. This saw investment earnings that accrued to superannuation funds receiving preferential tax treatment.
· In 1921 employer contributions to superannuation funds qualified for tax concessions.
The following subsection considers the debates around the first of these changes: the setting up of the National Provident Fund. This policy change was chosen as it was the first policy movement in this direction and accordingly it generated significant discussion.
The National Provident Fund scheme
Contributors to the National Provident Fund were required to be New Zealand citizens, between the ages of 16 and 45, and earning an income of less than £200 a year (National Provident Fund Act 1910, s 9(1)). In return for a compulsory weekly contribution, together with a governmentprovided subsidy, a pension plan provided sickness insurance, family support measures and a maternity allowance. The relative generosity and welfare intentions of the National Provident Fund are indicated by the fact that membership was initially restricted to those with an income of less than £200 per annum.
The fund provided flexibility whereby contributors could elect to cease membership, in which case a return of contributions made to the fund would be received. Fund members would be paid a weekly pension 13 after turning 60 and contributors could elect the amount of provision that he (or she, although female participation was low) could elect to receive when reaching the age of 60. This ranged from a weekly pension of ten shillings up to a weekly pension of forty shillings, based on the level of original contribution (National Provident Fund Act 1910, s12 (1)).
Under section 25(1) of the National Provident Fund Act 1910 the benefits provided were guaranteed to contributors by the government. Furthermore legislation allowed for the fund to be supplemented by the government to the amount of onefourth of the total contributions paid into the fund during the preceding year, with further amounts (if any) deemed by the GovernorinCouncil (National Provident Fund Act 1910, s25(2)). In reality the subsidy proved to be much greater than the onequarter allowed for by legislation, in effect being almost pound for pound subsidisation (Thomson, 1998) .
Arguments in support of the National Provident Fund
Overall there was considerable support for the National Provident Fund from all major political parties. The discussion that follows considers the primary arguments that were proposed in support of implementation of the National Provident Fund.
The duty of the State and decreased dependency
There is some disagreement about the original purpose of the National Provident Fund. However, newspaper articles of the time stated that the government was determined to encourage growth of selfreliance in an environment where private pension scheme evolution had been slow.
This was despite the apparent willingness of New Zealanders to invest in life insurance policies during this time (Thomson, 1998 
Arguments against the National Provident Fund
There were two main arguments raised against the implementation of the National Provident Fund.
These related to the cost of the scheme, and the potential for inequity (or unfairness) to result from its presence.
Expense
Overall the financial burden was not viewed as being potentially onerous in the future. 
Lack of equity
Concern for fairness appeared to be confined to whether the fund could be exploited by the wealthy and its potential to exclude workers that were not in constant fulltime employment. Mr A S Malcolm This would appear to indicate a concern for tax planning measures that might be undertaken by wealthier individuals, where National Provident Fund accounts could be opened in children's names in situations where parents were wealthy enough to be able to meet the contributions.
A view was expressed by the Hon J Rigg that there would be thousands of workers who would like to take advantage of the scheme but who would be unable to do so because their employment was so intermittent (NZPD, 1910b) . When asked what the situation would be in the case of a worker whose employment was intermittent the Prime Minister replied that the provision existed for an individual to pay in advance, and there was a further provision of six months' grace given to a contributor to enable payments in arrears to be made without any penalty. The Hon J Rigg continued to say: While there was both support for, and arguments against, the National Provident Fund Act during its preliminary stages, the majority appeared to support the initiative. The two primary arguments raised against the scheme did have an economic basis and related to the cost and equity, although neither appeared to be a significant concern at the time. With the exception of those related to changing behaviour, the discussions did not have a strong link to the theories proposed above, although this is not surprising as the theories have largely evolved since the implementation of the National Provident
Fund. The stronger focus of the time was on providing an incentive -and the means -to allow individuals to save for their own retirement.
-1984: The Welfare State
From the early few years of the century until 1938 there was little innovation in the welfare field in New Zealand (Rudd, 1993) . The next significant event came from the implementation of the Social Security Act (1938), which introduced the first effectively universal retirement benefit. The twotier public pension system introduced by the Act was to last through to the 1970s.
After the achievements in the welfare field under the first Labour Government, the periods of the 1950s and 1960s were "relatively barren years" (Rudd, 1993, p.228) . The various taxation concessions that were implemented from 1915 onwards, such as the deductions from income for tax purposes (to defined limits) for contributions to approved pension funds, and the deductions for employers for subsidies paid to approved pension schemes for their employees, remained largely unchanged until 1982. There was little movement on the provision of taxation incentives, with the exception of some minor changes in rates of subsidies. Asset testing on the age benefit was removed in 1960. There was little discussion of significance on the issue of taxation incentives between 1938 and 1984.
eligible employees had joined the National Provident Fund. In the late 1960s this figure began to decline. Despite the tax concessions, by the 1970s only about onethird of the labour force were members of superannuation funds (Holmes, 1975) . Thus the majority were relying on State provided benefits, other forms of saving, or private assistance to provide for retirement in old age. This may, in part, reflect the relative generosity of the State provision, which reduced incentives for individuals to undertake their own retirement income savings.
Towards the end of this period there were signs of both dissention between the political parties with regard to superannuation and a greater public awareness and concern with the future of superannuation. Two schemes were tried; the first was in 1974 when the Labour Government passed the New Zealand Superannuation Act 1974, which implemented a compulsory contributory superannuation scheme. The compulsory scheme was to have had combined contribution rates for employees and employers of up to eight per cent of earnings, which were to fund individual contributionsrelated pensions at retirement (Preston, 1999) . However, the scheme was highly unpopular and played no small part in the success of the National Government in the next election.
The second scheme tried was when the newly elected National Government repealed the shortlived compulsory superannuation scheme in 1976 and New Zealand returned to a universal superannuation scheme titled National Superannuation. Superannuation was now financed out of ordinary government revenue, whereas prior to this time the social welfare benefits of the Social Security Act 
-2000: The NeoLiberal State
During the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand was to experience considerable social policy change. Both
Labour and National Governments turned from an interventionist state model with a sheltered economy to a deregulated economy, a more minimal state and "a range of strategies to lighten what came to be called the welfare burden" (McClure, 1998, p.210) .
When the Fourth Labour Government won the 1984 election, economic progress was of primary concern to policymakers. The prosperity seen in earlier decades had disappeared and the new Minister of Finance, the Hon Roger Douglas, was faced with a nearbankrupt economy and the requirement to reduce government expenditure. Superannuation, as the costliest of the universal benefits, was the first area to be challenged, despite prior assurances to the population that superannuation would not be changed.
The Labour Government introduced an income test for national superannuation in 1985 and increased the age of eligibility to 65 (on a gradual basis), as well making it taxable (Rudd, 1997) . In 1990 the National Government replaced National Superannuation with the Guaranteed Retirement Income Scheme, with an associated tax surcharge on 'other income' above a specified limit. As part of the deregulation process, the Labour Government enacted the Taxation removing tax concessions that benefited some at the expense of others and ensuring that assistance was provided in an evenhanded way to those whose needs were the same. The reforms included:
· changing the taxation rates for superannuation funds, life offices and related organisations; · removal of personal and employer concessions for superannuation contributions, life insurance premiums and other related expenses; and · making fund earnings taxable at full rates.
These changes were designed to move the tax treatment of superannuation and life insurance on to the same basis as other forms of saving and investment. Table 1 outlines the tax treatment of schemes as they stood in 1987. 
Arguments for removal of incentives
In the mid to late 1980s a number of economic reforms of taxation incentives were enacted, most of which had the general aim of increasing efficiency. The majority of the arguments for removing the extant incentives had a neoclassical economic foundation. The primary arguments raised in support of removing the taxation incentives are outlined below.
Greater efficiency
Efficiency, or the inefficiency created through incentives, produced a strong argument for the changes witnessed at this time. Mr J R Sutton (MP for Waitaki) said during the first reading of the Taxation Reform Bill (No 5) 1988, which was to implement the changes, "the market is the market. Though some people do not like it, it has to be recognised that market forces play a role in everybody's economic decisions" (NZPD, 1988) .
It was believed that the 'level playingfield' that would be created by removing tax incentives would force institutions to be competitive. Mr Sutton claimed that this increased competition would encourage saving -as the reforms would make lower tax rates possible, and therefore make it easier for people to save (NZPD, 1988 It was claimed that removal of tax incentives would improve efficiency through decreasing government expenditure, which would allow for lower income tax rates -estimated by the Treasury (1987) to be a decrease of about 2.5 cents per dollar for all taxpayers. This, in turn, would increase an individual's ability and incentive to save.
Expense
In 1987 the Treasury announced that the existing tax privileges provided to superannuation and life insurance cost considerable sums of money in tax revenue foregone, claiming they contributed to a tax system that had incurred a high economic cost. The Treasury forecast that if the tax privileges continued into 1988/89, the privileged tax position of superannuation funds and life offices would (at the existing tax rates) cost the government $800 million in tax revenue forgone (in 1988/89 dollars).
Equity: who pays versus who benefits
When implementing the changes to the scheme the New Zealand Treasury (1987) In general, higherincome earners saved more than lowerincome earners and so were in a better position to take advantage of the tax concessions. Ms P E Tennet (MP for Island Bay) claimed that when superannuation was offered as part of a remuneration package, it should not be paid for through the taxation system. Ms Tennet further noted that many people were not fortunate enough to be members of superannuation schemes: 
Arguments against removal of incentives
The arguments that were raised for retaining the taxation incentives relating to retirement income savings frequently involved the quoting of figures and statistics that differed greatly depending on the political persuasion from which the arguments were introduced. The primary arguments mentioned for retaining the incentives are outlined below.
Incentives increase national savings
The Treasury (1987) stated that the argument that superannuation taxation privileges are required to encourage savings did not stand up, claiming there was no rationale for encouraging savings through one particular institutional form. There was evidence that much of the savings that was put through superannuation schemes was withdrawn and spent before retirement. The Treasury claimed that the effect of the extant incentives was more likely to influence the form of savings, rather than the overall level of savings. Moreover, the cut in income tax rates that was promised as a result of the removal of the incentives would allow for more effective saving than the incentives themselves.
In support of the reforms, Mr C D Matthewson (MP for Dunedin West) claimed that levels of savings in New Zealand were not low -indeed they were higher than the average level of all the OECD countries (NZPD 1989) . Mr Matthewson stated that Japan had the highest savings as a percentage of gross domestic product at 17.5%, while New Zealand had 12.7%. The OECD average was 8.2% and Australia was 3.7%.
Mr Matthewson stated that the changes would not inhibit savings, providing two sources of evidence:
"the first is the reaction to the removal of the tax exemption for superannuation contributions.
Since that change was made the superannuation schemes that have been cancelled represent 0.6% of the superannuation funds. The other example for that would be the figures for life insurance that has been taken out. Since the tax exemption was removed life insurance premiums paid by New Zealanders have reached a record level" (NZPD 1989).
Mr Matthewson claimed that the reason for this is because New Zealanders know that if they put their money into funds that are professionally managed they would probably get a better return than they could achieve for themselves.
Ruth Richardson, MP adopted a different approach, claiming at the beginning of the 1980s New Zealanders were saving 16.6% as a percentage of gross domestic product, which had reduced to 11% (NZPD, 1988) . Similarly, if savings levels were low, as Ms Richardson suggested, then this indicated the incumbent incentives were not proving to be successful, thus strengthening the case for their removal.
Perhaps the more rational argument was provided by Mr J R Sutton MP who claimed that people would be better able to save because taxpayers "will have an extra $900 million left in their pay packets from which to save, or if they prefer, to build up their businesses or farm businesses" (NZPD, 1989 NZPD, 1989) .
In summary, unlike the policy changes made nearly 80 years earlier, there was considerable disagreement and debate around the context of the 1988 reforms. As would be expected there was a greater alignment between the two periods with the economic arguments raised above as the government's aim of improving the standard of living through economic growth has remained throughout this time. Macroeconomic benefits were strengthened by reference to the cost of the incumbent scheme and the economic benefits of competition between funds were raised in support of the changes. This period had a greater recognition of the potential inequity inherent in the extant scheme. Overall, the focus was less on changing behaviour and more on increasing economic efficiency.
-2005: an emerging NeoWelfare State
To consider whether this paper can assist with future policy, it is necessary to look at how well it explains the present situation. One might consider that the ruling political party would provide some indication of the likely future policy direction that taxation incentives for retirement income savings might take, but history has shown this not to be the case. A socialist oriented Liberal Government was responsible for the introduction of incentives in 1910, which remained supported by a number of political parties with varying degrees of political persuasions over the next 78 years. A neoliberal Labour Government then removed the incentives, although this Labour Government had to a large extent been forced into taking a 'turn to the right' to resolve the volatile economic situation they found themselves faced with upon election.
With this background, consideration was given to the political environment of the time to investigate how well this might explain the policy decisions made. In the Liberal / Welfare era of what appeared to be a strong focus on social policy, there were few robust arguments put forward against implementing taxation incentives to encourage individuals to save to support themselves in their retirement. In the neoliberal era of economic efficiency the strong arguments were founded on removing the incumbent incentives. If we consider that the current New Zealand political environment has moved towards a neowelfare ideology, where economic policy is tempered by social policy, it is suggested that this environment does explain the changes towards taxation incentives and retirement income savings that we are seeing at the present time. These changes are discussed below. and structures to build a sustainable longterm revenue base, from the perspective of whether the tax system was adequate to meet current needs. The Final Report identified problems within the extant tax system, and made recommendations regarding potential solutions. One of the topics considered in the review was savings. The Final Report concluded that it was not apparent that New Zealanders saved too little, and furthermore that there was little evidence that changes to the tax system were likely to induce higher saving. The Final Report also identified that the tax system would influence the absolute level of saving to the extent that it affects the level of national income, and accordingly it was viewed as important to avoid introducing tax distortions that may result in lowerquality savings and investment choices.
The changes that followed this report, such as the implementation of the SSRSS and the suggested introduction of the KiwiSaver account, indicate that the government has been prepared to introduce savings vehicles that are likely to distort decisionmaking. Whether or not these distortions will result in lowerquality savings and investment choices than would otherwise be made still remains to be seen. Accordingly, the indication prior to the election that the government was no longer opposed to providing 'incentives' and mechanisms of encouraging retirement savings -both at the level of the individual and at governmental level -may now lose impetus. The overall suggestion is that in a political environment supporting a welfarist approach, there is a greater likelihood that incentives for retirement savings would be looked upon favourably. Conversely if the political environment was to move towards a stronger neoliberal focus, then the likelihood of incentives being supported is reduced.
Conclusion
This paper considered the nature and role of taxation incentives for retirement income savings from a historical perspective. While the broad contexts of the arguments for and against the provision of incentives were similar in the periods considered, there were clearly different areas of focus that came through in the discussions. The period of liberal philosophy introduced incentives for retirement income savings, the welfare state period maintained these incentives, while the period of neoliberal philosophy removed them.
The primary focus during the introduction of the incentives through the National Provident Fund in 1910 was on decreasing state dependency, while simultaneously providing state support to enable people to be more selfreliant. There was little discussion about the possible expense of the scheme, or the potential for the scheme to change the savings patterns of individuals. The equitybased arguments did not consider that all taxpayers were subsidising a scheme that not all taxpayers would have equal access to; rather the concern was that the wealthy might take advantage of the scheme.
Overall the implementation of the National Provident Fund had broad support from both sides of the House, whereas the reforms in the late 1980s provoked significantly opposing views.
During the 1988 reforms the arguments for removing the incentives were primarily focused on economic efficiency. This is not surprising as tax incentives were removed in the time when neo classical economics was prevalent. It was clear that the government wanted to install a levelplaying field to encourage competition between superannuation providers, with an aim of increasing efficiency within the sector. There was also a strong focus on improving equity as evidence indicated that those who gained most advantage from the presence of the incentives were those that needed the least assistance. The arguments for retaining incentives, at that time and since, were inconclusive. There was no supporting evidence for the claim that incentives increased national savings or economic growth, and their effectiveness in decreasing state dependency was debatable.
With recent initiatives such as the SSRSS and KiwiSaver, the Labourled New Zealand Government had demonstrated the intent to again provide taxation incentives to encourage individuals to save for their retirement. However, the 2005 election results are likely to thwart further progress in this direction. The indication is that a welfarist political environment is likely to support taxation incentives for retirement income savings. Conversely a strong neoliberal philosophy is likely to be less encouraging of this approach.
Notes
1
The one exception is for a highincome (earning over NZ$60,000 per annum) workbased superannuation fund member. As employer contributions and fund earnings are taxed at 33%, but the highest marginal tax rate in New Zealand is 39% (for earnings over NZ$60,000), an individual paying the 39% marginal tax rate will potentially benefit from a 6% saving. This anomaly saw the introduction of tax avoidance schemes, such as 'salary sacrifice' where employees paying the highest marginal tax rate could negotiate an increase in their employer superannuation contributions, taxed at 33%, with a corresponding reduction in salary subject to tax at 39%. The contributions could then be withdrawn from the fund soon afterwards, avoiding the 39% top marginal tax rate. Some attempt has been made to address this anomaly through the introduction of a five per cent withdrawal tax when funds are withdrawn, other than in specific circumstances, such as when an employee leaves the job or can demonstrate significant hardship.
2
Projections suggest that the population aged 65 and over will grow by about 100,000 during the next decade. After this time the increase will accelerate, growing by 215,000 and 250,000 respectively in the following two decades. The cost of publicly providing retirement income at the current level (of 65 per cent of the average wage for a married couple) is projected to exceed 8% of Gross Domestic Product over the next fifty years (doubling from 4% in 2001) as the demographic profile changes (Stephenson and Scobie, 2002) .
3
The classification used is based on research by Wilkes (1993) and Thorns and Sedgwick (1997) .
4
A universal pension is available (with some constraints) to the population.
5
The level of benefit provided is dependent on the government departments. Many government departments have an upper limit of three per cent as the employer contribution.
6
Research has shown that automatic enrolment in occupational schemes may be effective in using inertia effects to promote pension saving, as around only 10 -20% of employees optout of these schemes (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005) .
7
This scheme is also intended to help first home buyers. Savings may be removed from the scheme after a minimum of three years to contribute toward a deposit on a first home. After three years of saving the government will offer a first home deposit subsidy of $1000 per year of membership in the scheme, up to a maximum of $5000 for five years. For example, through enhancing incentives to perform when holding a direct stake in risky financial assets (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2002) .
10
For example, Sinfield (2002) writes that tax relief in the United Kingdom saw the top 10% of taxpayers receiving over 50% of the benefit, with a quarter going to the top 2.5%. The bottom 10% of earners received just 1% of the tax benefit. Similar research under taken in the United States of America (e.g. Burman, Gale and Orszag, 2004) finds that about 70% of tax benefits from new contributions to defined plans accrue to the highestincome 20% of tax filing units, with more than half going to the top 10%.
11
It is argued that this type of effect meant that pre1988 investors in taxpreferred life and superannuation products in New Zealand did not enjoy superior aftertax rates of return compared to investors in nontax preferred products (Goss and Duncan, 1999) .
12
Reagonomics Effect on Savings, Business Week, March 8 1982 , cited in Swanstrom (1989 .
13
Other benefits existed, such as payments on the birth of a child, for incapacity to work, and weekly payments to remaining family members on the death of the contributor.
14 Friendly Societies were mutual aid associations formed by working men as a means of sharing the risk and costs brought about primarily by illhealth (Thomson, 1998) .
15
Actuarial examination of the National Provident Fund for the Triennium ending 31 December 1914 , AJHR, H17B, 1916 , p1, cited in Thomson (1998 .
16 Source: New Zealand Yearbooks 1970 -1984 For comparison purposes the treatment of savings, such as funds in a bank account, would have contributions made from pretax income, the fund earnings would be taxed, and the benefits would be tax exempt when paid out. This is the system that is in place in New Zealand today for all savings vehicles.
18
Various figures were quoted at the time regarding the financial cost of the tax incentives. The Treasury (1987) claimed the cost to be $800 million -but during the debates this figure ranged from $800 million to $1.1 billion.
19
No reference was made as to the source of the figures. The discrepancy with the figures quoted two paragraphs earlier is noted.
20
It is noted that this would mean that each scheme held (on average) less than $100,000. The discrepancy with the comments of Mr Matthewson in the previous section is noted.
